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Leigh: Criminal Law - Absence of Counsel during Reinstruction of the Jur
CRIMINAL LAW-Absence of Counsel During Reinstruction of the Jury in a
Criminal Proceeding. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1976).

Appellant James Hoskins was tried on a charge of grand
larceny. After the jury had deliberated for approximately
six hours, they sent a note to the trial judge reading, "We
cannot reach a verdict due to lack of evidence."' Upon receiving the note, the judge reinstructed the jury in open court,
but outside the presence of the regular counsel for the defendant.2 Among the supplemental instructions given to the
jury was the following statement: "You have commented
that to this point you feel there is lack of evidence. There is
evidence. Please reconsider the evidence in this case.""
The jury returned for further deliberations, and shortly
thereafter the defendant was convicted.
It is fundamental that the giving of supplemental instructions rests with the discretion of the trial judge. This
is supported by the fact that none of the federal courts of appeal nor any of the state courts has prohibited such instructions.4 Therefore the essential question becomes whether the
giving of supplemental instructions in the absence of the accused's counsel constitutes a deprivation of his right to a fair
and impartial trial.5 The Wyoming Supreme Court held pursuant to Rule 49 (a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure6 that, although there was technical error, the defendant was in no way prejudiced by the absence of counsel
and therefore the error was not reversible.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GENERAL

The law is well established that the right to counsel extends to all criminal proceedings. In Gideon v. Wainwright'
Copyright

0

1977 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 344 (Wyo. 1976).
2. Although it appears that regular counsel for the defendant appointed a
substitute counsel to appear on behalf of the defendant, because of the inadequacy of the record the court assumed arguendo that defendant was not
represented by counsel at the time the supplemental instructions were given
to the jury. Id at 344.
3. Id. at 345.
4. Senneff, Instructing the Deadlocked Jury: Some Practical Considerations,
JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 169 (1974).

5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
WYO. CONST. Art 1 § 10, states, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel . ..."
6. WYO. R. CRIM. P. 49(a) Harmless error. Any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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the United States Supreme Court invalidated a Florida
statute which denied the appointment of counsel in a noncapital offense. The Court found the statute to be violative of
the accused's constitutional right to counsel as guaranteed by
the sixth amendment. As the Court noted, the fact that the
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants hire
lawyers for their defense is a strong indication of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal cases are necessities.'
Mirandav. Arizonae extended the right to counsel to pretrial interrogation. The court found that the right to counsel
at a custodial interrogation was essential to the development
of an effective defense and to mitigate any feeling of untrustworthiness that the defendant might have during that
time. The Supreme Court further extended the right to
counsel to an arraignment where certain rights of the accused
might be sacrificed or lost.'0
As early as 1932 the United States Supreme Court noted
that the accused requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceeding." This requirement has been extended
by both state and federal courts, including the United States
Supreme Court. They have consistently held that the right to
counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment applies to all
critical stages of the proceedings. 2 The Supreme Court in
United States v. Wade held a post-indictment lineup to be
a critical stage. The Court emphasized that,
[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand
alone against the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's
right to a fair trial."8
Consequently, the right to counsel requires the court to determine whether the potential for substantial prejudice to de8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 344.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); State v. Zimmer, 198 Kan.
479, 426 P.2d 267 (1967); State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907
(1968) ; State v. Schenck, 151 Mont. 493, 444 P.2d 861 (1968).
13. United States v. Wade, supra note 12, at 226.
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fendant's rights inheres in a particular situation and if so,
the ability of counsel to avoid that prejudice.14
ABSENCE OF COUNSEL DURING REINSTRUCTION OF THE JURY

There are two distinct lines of authority with regard to
the necessity of presence of counsel during the recital of supplemental instructions to the jury. The rule sustained by one
line of decisions is that if the supplemental instructions are
given in open court it is not error to give them in the absence
of counsel.15 The better rule is that the giving of further instructions in the absence of, or without notice to counsel and
defendant, is error. This view was established by the United
States Supreme Court in the civil case of Fillipponv. Albion
Vein Slate Co."0 The Court held that the trial judge erred
in giving a supplemental instruction to the jury in absence
of the parties or their counsel without affording them an opportunity to be present or make timely objection. This ruling was extended to a criminal case in Shields v. United
States."7 The Court observed that the Fillippon rule was
especially applicable to a criminal proceeding, and it was prejudicial error for the judge to communicate with the jury in
the absence of the defendant and his counsel. This view is
supported by a large number of federal and state courts.'
Several courts have expressed the opinion with regard
to the giving of supplemental instructions that,
...if the record shows error, but does not disclose
whether the error is prejudicial or whether it is not
prejudicial, it is presumed to be prejudicial and to
require reversal.19
14. Id. at 227.
15. Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266, 77 A.2d 183 (1950).
16. 250 U.S. 76 (1919).

17. 273 U.S. 583 (1927).
18. United States v. Schor, 418 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969); Rice v. United States,
356 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1966); Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d
805 (9th Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Marken, 457 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1972);
State v. Brugger, 84 N.M. 135, 500 P.2d 420 (1972); State v. Ramirez, 111
Ariz. 498, 533 P.2d 665 (1975).
19. Ah Fook Chang v. United States, supf note 18, at 810; Rice v. United
States, supra note 18.
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In Hoskins v. State there is some indication that regular
counsel for the defendant appointed a substitute counsel to
appear on the behalf of the defendant. However, the appointment of substitute counsel has been held not to be sufficient
to satisfy the accused's right to counsel.20
The Wyoming Supreme Court did not address the issue
of the sufficiency of substitute counsel. The majority opinion
assumed arguendo that the defendant was not represented
by counsel at the time the supplemental instructions were
given to the jury. Consequently, the court found technical
error, but held the error to be harmless because it did not
substantially affect the rights of the defendant. This decision was based on the theory that an error, to be regarded as
harmful, must present the possibility that, in absence of error,
the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant."'
The court found that the supplemental instructions in no
way had a coercive effect on the minds of the jurors and therefore the instructions themselves did not constitute error. The
factual situation in Hoskins is similar to the facts in Jenkins
v. United States.' After two hours of deliberation the Jenkins jury informed the Court that it lacked sufficient evidence
to decide the case. The judge then commented to the jury,
"That is all the evidence there is, that is all the evidence anybody can have." The jury returned with a guilty verdict
shortly thereafter. This cominent is very similar to the one
made by the judge in Hoskins.' Additionally, however the
judge in Jenkins stated that "you have got to reach a decision
in this case." The United States Supreme Court held that,
under the circumstances of the case, the judge's statements
had a coercive effect on the jury, and, consequently reversed
the conviction.
20. People v. Valentine, 45 App. Div. 2d 1043, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (1974).
21. Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1973); WYo. R. CRIM P. 49(a), supra
note 6.
22. 330 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
23. Hoskins v. State, supra note 1, at 349.
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The test often used to determine whether supplemental
instructions constitute error is whether they force or help to
force an agreement or whether they merely start a new train
of deliberation ending the disagreement." Using this as a
test it is submitted that the judge's words in Hoskins had the
potential to force an agreement. The jury was obviously
deadlocked and unable to reach a verdict because of lack of
evidence. The most likely interpretation of the jury's note
is that the jury had decided that there was insufficient evidence for conviction. The jury only deliberated for a short
time after the reinstruction. It is, therefore, not beyond
reason to conclude that the judge's statements were interpreted by the jury to mean that there was sufficient evidence
to convict. Under these circumstances, regardless of the
judge's intentions, it is posited that the statement was potentially prejudicial. Thus, the Supreme Court's reasoning that,
in the absence of these particular instructions, the verdict
would not have been more favorable to the defendant must
be seriously questioned.
The court next addressed, perhaps the most important
issue in the case, specifically, whether the absence of defense
counsel deprived the defendant of his right to be represented
at all stages of the proceeding.
The opinion takes notice of the fact that defense counsel
failed to make a timely objection to the court's supplemental
instruction." However, following trial, defense counsel filed
a motion for a new trial challenging the supplemental instructions. Thus, the trial judge was given an opportunity to
rule on the propriety of his instructions, in considering the
motion for a new trial. The Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that, since the trial judge ruled favorably on the supplemental instructions, the defendant could not have been
prejudiced by the absence of counsel, other than losing an op24. Williams v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 220 Kan. 51, 434 P.2d 765 (1967).
25. WYO. R. Civ. P. 51 requires that: "No party may assign as error the giving
or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the
jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which
he objects and the grounds of his objection." See also WYo. R. CRIM. P. 31.
Defense counsel's failure to make timely objection was undoubtedly due to
his absence from the court room at the time the instruction was given.
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portunity to enter an objection to the instruction at the time
given. The court therefore concluded that the decision must
be affirmed because the error was harmless.
None of the cases previously discussed deal directly with
the problem of whether or not the giving of supplemental instructions is a critical stage in the proceeding as defined by
United States v. Wade. 6 It is submitted that it is a critical
stage, and, therefore, any absence of counsel during reinstruction of the jury is a violation of the sixth amendment,
which is made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth
amendment.27 Wade interpreted the sixth amendment as
requiring counsel whenever necessary to assure a meaningful
defense.
The Wyoming Supreme Court found that, since the trial
judge had ruled on the instructions and found them to be
unprejudicial, there was no reversible error." However,
presence of defense counsel would have removed some of the
doubt surrounding the effect of the supplemental instructions
in this case. The supplemental instructions were made when
the defendant was required to stand alone against the state. 9
Had counsel been present, he would have been in a position to
submit alternative instructions or request a different course
of action. Most importantly, he could have objected to the
instructions at the time given. Furthermore he could have
requested the judge to make it clear to the jury that his instructions were to be construed as meaning there was evidence
on both sides.
By the time counsel submitted his objection, the damage
had already occurred. Therefore, it is of little consequence
that the trial judge addressed the issue after the accused
had been convicted. The outcome of the trial and the future
of the defendant depended on the impact the supplemental
instructions had on the jury. Consequently, it is reasonable
to conclude that this was a most critical stage in the proceed26.
27.
28.
29.

Supra note 12.
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 7.
Hoskins v. State, supra note 1, at 351.
Id. at 353.
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ing. Absence of counsel at this point exceeds constitutional
guarantees and should have been construed as reversible
error.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court held in
Hoskins that, all circumstances considered, there was no reversible error. If this is in fact the case, it is not difficult to
ascertain a most important consideration. If the error was
truly harmless, it would be a travesty on justice to allow
a defendant who was unquestionably guilty to be set free.
There can be no valid reason to free an accused when there
was error, providing it in no way affected the outcome. To
this extent, the majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court was,
unequivocally, correct.
It is submitted that Hoskins v. State presents quite a different factual situation. As previously pointed out, the jury
was unable to reach a verdict. That in itself sheds some doubt
as to the defendant's guilt, based on the evidence given.
The right to counsel during the giving of supplemental
instructions is the logical extension of past United States
Supreme Court decisions. The Court in United States v.
Wade"0 extended the right to counsel to a post-indictment lineup. As emphasized by the Court:
Since... there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not.., and since presence of counsel.., can
often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that...
the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the
prosecution ......
This reasoning can be applied with even greater authority
when considering the potential for prejudice during the reinstruction of the jury. If the accused is entitled to counsel
prior to trial it is difficult to imagine any countervailing
80. Supra note 12.
31. Id. at 236-37.
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policy considerations that can be advanced against the requirement of presence of counsel during all stages of the trial.
Furthermore, presence of counsel prevents coercion and assures that the accused will be treated fairly.
However, the most important consideration is that the
presence of counsel assures the defendant of a meaningful
defense. Considering the amount of effort required by the
court to make certain counsel is present and the great potential for prejudice during the reinstruction of the jury, it seems
elementary that the absolute right to counsel extend to this
portion of the proceeding.
CONCLUSION

The supplemental instructions given by the trial judge
in Hoskins v. State were potentially prejudicial to the defendant. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
instructions had no prejudicial effect, it is unquestioned that
the accused's right to counsel under the sixth amendment is
absolute at all critical stages of the proceeding. The reinstruction of the jury must be considered a critical stage because of the potential for prejudice. Furthermore, the judge
conceivably controls the defendant's future at this point in
the proceeding. Consequently, reinstruction of the jury in
the absence of counsel is fundamental error and constitutes
reversible error regardless of whether the instructions are
prejudicial on their face.
STEVEN LEIGH
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